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In September 2016, Wells Fargo Company was fined a large amount of money due to its 
employees opening unauthorized accounts and credit cards under customer’s names. This paper 
examines the effects of the lawsuit announcement on the stock market as it pertains to finance, 
insurance, and real estate firms. The analysis will be completed using the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) and various control variables through univariate and multivariate tests. The 
results of these tests show that the markets did not lose confidence or trust in banks. Instead, the 
Wells Fargo scandal generated positive CARs for other banks on the day of the lawsuit 
announcement.   
1. INTRODUCTION 
 On September 8, 2016, one of the largest banks in the United States, Wells Fargo 
Company (WFC), was fined $185 million. Employees of the company issued 565,000 
unauthorized credit cards and opened 1.5 million fake accounts. Employees began these illegal 
banking practices as early as 2011 due to the incentives and pressure to open new accounts from 
the company. Once customers began to notice the unexpected fees and cards arriving in the mail, 
it began to shine a light on Wells Fargo’s illegal practices and their troubled internal culture at 
the company. This scandal led to 5,300 employees being fired including a number of managers 
(Corkery 2016). Since this was such a large scandal within the banking industry, this paper will 
examine the effects that the lawsuit announcement had within the finance and banking sector. 
   Since banks are a major part of the world and people entrust them with their own 
deposits, it is important for depositors to have faith and confidence within their bank. If 
individuals lack trust in banks, the number of deposits would fall. The potential effects of lower 
deposits are a decrease in consumer spending because consumers lack access to credit to make 
large purchases and banks would not have the funds to loan. A scandal, such as the Wells Fargo 
scandal, could potentially cause distrust between banks and depositors. Therefore, the overall 
motivation for this paper is to gain a better understanding of how markets react to this particular 
scandal within the banking industry. Some potential research questions associated with banking 
scandals are: Will individuals/markets lose confidence and trust in banks? Is a certain type of 
firm affected more than the other? Does the size of the bank matter? What factors play a bigger 
role in the effects of a scandal? While scandals in the banking industry are not common, it can be 
useful to comprehend how individuals and markets react to these types of situations for investing 
purposes and to understand individual’s thinking surrounding banks.  
In order to answer some of the above questions, this study conducts several types of 
analyses using information from the stock market on the day of the lawsuit announcement. The 
main two types of tests done will be univariate and multivariate. These tests resulted in the key 
finding that deposit and non-deposit firms (other than Wells Fargo) had positive cumulative 
abnormal returns surrounding the scandal. Meanwhile, some other firms in the finance sector had 
negative cumulative abnormal returns but not as much as Wells Fargo’s negative returns. This 
shows that the market perception of Wells Fargo’s direct competitors as well as some indirect 
competitors benefited from the scandal. Therefore, it can be inferred that customers did not lose 
their confidence and trust in banks generally. They only lost their trust in Wells Fargo. The next 
key finding is that larger deposit firms had higher positive returns compared to middle and 
smaller sized firms. This implies that the positive spillover effects from the scandal did not affect 
middle to smaller sized firms in the same way as the scandal affected larger firms. Also, it 
suggests that the trust in middle to smaller sized firms stayed fairly consistent while people put 
more trust into larger firms except Wells Fargo. The next two findings focus on the factors that 
have the greatest effect and significance on the cumulative abnormal returns during the 
occurrence of a banking scandal. The first analysis concluded that the volatility control variable 
had the greatest effect on the cumulative abnormal returns. Also, firm size and the binary deposit 
variable showed high significance but lower effects on the CARs compared to the volatility 
variable. The second analysis adds an interaction term between the size of the firm and if it was a 
deposit firm or not. The result concluded that the interaction term showed some significance but 
mainly after the event occurred. Volatility still remained to be the variable with the overall 
greatest effect on the cumulative abnormal returns. Overall, volatility, deposits, and firm size 
appear to be the most significant factors for this banking scandal. 
2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In an academic article by Mohamad Jamal Zeidan, it states, “In a sample of 128 publicly 
traded banks that were subject to enforcement actions by US regulatory authorities over a 20-
year period, we observed a significant negative market reaction pursuant to the violations” 
(Zeidan 2012). This article assisted with the initial hypothesis development as well as the fact 
that banks play such an important role in our economy. The initial hypothesis for this analysis 
was that most, or all banks, would have negative cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the 
lawsuit. Although, I do not expect them to be as negative as Wells Fargo’s returns. The thought 
process behind this hypothesis is that a scandal within the banking industry may cause people to 
lose their confidence and trust in banks generally. Based on the market capitalization, Wells 
Fargo Company is the largest bank in the market. So, if the largest bank on the stock market is 
being corrupt, what are other banks doing? I felt that other individuals may be thinking the same 
thing about their own personal bank or one they are invested in. From an investor’s standpoint, I 
would be reconsidering my investment in a company if they were committing illegal practices. 
Wells Fargo was deceptive about how many accounts and credit cards they were issuing which 
makes me reconsider how well the company is doing and the actual value of the firm. Therefore, 
I thought investors may pull out of some of their banking stocks due to a lack of confidence 
within their investment.  
My second hypothesis was that, if indeed individuals lose confidence in banks generally, 
then deposit institutions would see greater negative cumulative abnormal returns in comparison 
to other types of firms in the industry. The main reason being that Wells Fargo’s is a deposit 
bank and the publication of the lawsuit should impact their direct competitors the greatest. The 
second part of this hypothesis is that companies indirectly related to Wells Fargo will experience 
little to no effect from the lawsuit. My opinion is that individuals invested in firms that are 
indirectly related to Wells Fargo will not have as great of a concern about the scandal. Therefore, 
I was expecting minimal CARs for indirectly related firms that are still within the finance 
industry. 
 My third hypothesis is that banks of larger size – or banks that are comparable to Wells 
Fargo – would see higher negative returns in comparison to middle to smaller size firms. The main 
reason behind this hypothesis is that people tend to trust smaller firms over larger ones. An article 
by Andrew Dugan states, “Americans are more than three times as likely to express confidence in 
small business as they are in big business” (Dugan 2019). Smaller businesses tend to give the 
impression of being more trustworthy to consumers because they appear more personable due to 
the closer employee – consumer relationship. Consumers of smaller businesses have a greater 
chance of their voices being heard and the opportunity to communicate with upper management, 
if needed. In a larger firm, many customer support tools are automated or online and it creates a 
barrier between the consumers and the employees. This can affect the trust a consumer has due to 
the lack of personal communication. So, with a higher trust in smaller businesses, I assume that 
individuals invested in smaller banks would not be as alarmed by Wells Fargo’s illegal practices. 
Therefore, my prediction was that Wells Fargo’s closest competitors which are larger banks such 
as JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and Bank of America would see larger negative cumulative 
abnormal returns compared to smaller banks.  
 The fourth hypothesis will focus on analysis from the multivariate tests. My prediction for 
multivariate testing was that deposit and size of firm would have the highest significance and effect 
on the cumulative abnormal returns. The reasons are heavily based off of the previous hypotheses. 
With the belief that direct competitors will have higher negative returns, I expect that the deposit 
variable will have a greater effect on the CARs of companies when there is a banking scandal. 
Also, I feel this variable will have a higher significance compared to other variables in the model. 
Similarly, I believe that the size of the firm will have a greater effect on the CARs compared to 
the other control variables but less than the deposit variable. I assume size will have a high 
significance as well since Wells Fargo’s closest competitors should be affected the most. 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
 The data for this research analysis was retrieved using Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS) and The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Using the daily stock file, I 
selected a date range of just one day which was September 8, 2016. This is the date the Wells 
Fargo lawsuit of $185 million was announced. The following query variables were selected from 
CRSP for this analysis: Ticker, Share Code, Exchange Code, SIC Code, Price, Share Volume, 
Open Price, Ask or High, Bid or Low, Closing Bid, Closing Ask, Holding Period Return, 
Number of Shares Outstanding and Value-Weighted Return (includes distributions). The results 
were cleaned and narrowed down to SIC codes 60 – 67. These are the SIC codes for Finance, 
Insurance, and Real Estate firms. After cleaning, there was a total of 3,192 observations with 
majority of the firms being holding companies and other investment offices. Table 1 shows a 
sample of the firms based off the SIC codes. 
Using the query variables mentioned above, the following control variables were 
calculated for analysis: Deposit, Non-Deposit, Size (in 1000s), Price, Volatility, Spread, and 
Turnover. Deposit and Non-Deposit variables are dummy variables. Deposit equals one if the 
current firm has a SIC code of 60; otherwise it is zero. Non-Deposit equals one if the current 
firm has a SIC code of 61; otherwise it is zero. Firms with SIC codes 62 – 67 are the base 
category for the dummy variables and will be referred to as other firms during analysis. Table 2 
displays the summary statistics of the control variables. The summary statistics show a high level 
of skewness for the price and size variables. There is a massive difference between the median 
and mean showing the high skewness. When multivariate analysis occurs, the natural log will be 
taken of these variables to normalize the distribution. For further description of the data, Table 3 
shows the correlation matrix between control variables. In the correlation matrix, the majority of 
the control variables have a negative correlation. The highest correlations in the table occur 
within the volatility column with the highest correlation being 0.3075 between volatility and 
spread. Also, since size is calculated using price multiplied by volume, size and price have one 
of the higher correlations in the table. Some of lowest correlations occur within the price column. 
This shows that price relates negatively and very little to the other control variables.  
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 For the analysis, six cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) were calculated for each stock 
to evaluate the impact of the lawsuit on stock prices in the finance sector. The cumulative 
abnormal returns were calculated by determining the market and individual stock return for one 
day and subtracting the market return from the individual stock return. This results in the 
abnormal return for one day. There will be abnormal returns calculated for numerous days and 
added together to form cumulative abnormal returns for six different periods. The CARs will 
have periods that surround the event as well as after the event. The periods calculated 
surrounding the event is for five trading days before and five days after the event (-5,5) and three 
days before and after the event (-3,3). The CARs calculated following the event are for one day 
(0,1), three days (0,3), five days (0,5), and thirty days after the event (0,30). These cumulative 
abnormal returns will be used for several univariate and multivariate tests in this section. Located 
in Table 4 are the CARs for Wells Fargo. These numbers can be used for a base comparison of 
other companies’ performance in the univariate tests surrounding the revelation of the illegal 
practices and lawsuit. 
The first univariate analysis will compare the effects of the lawsuit based off of the firm 
type. For this test, the data is separated using the dummy variables based off the SIC codes that 
were mentioned in the previous section. The comparison will be between all firms, deposit firms, 
non-deposit firm, and other firms. All firms will contain all 3,192 observations. Deposits have 
356 observations and non-deposit has 44 observations. The remaining 2,792 firms will be listed 
as other firms. This univariate test will use the average and median of the cumulative abnormal 
returns for analysis. Table 5 shows the results and the test statistics for this univariate test. These 
results display that deposit and non-deposit firms stock prices increased as a result of Wells 
Fargo’s negative news. Meanwhile, the results show that the announcement resulted in a 
negative effect on all firms and other firms. Since majority of the observations are located in 
other firms, it’s reasonable that these two firm types would have similar results. When 
comparing Table 4 and Table 5, majority of the companies fared better than Wells Fargo even 
with all firms and other firms having negative reactions to the news of the lawsuit.  
Since Wells Fargo’s direct competitors (deposit firms) responded positively to the 
lawsuit, a further in-depth analysis of deposit firms will be done. The analysis will categorize 
deposit institutions into three sections based on size. The sections will be largest, middle-sized, 
and smallest deposit firms. This analysis will help determine the effects of the lawsuit on the 
different sizes of depository institutions. Table 6 shows the results of this analysis. For three 
CAR’s that were calculated after the event occurred, the largest deposit firms were able to gain 
between 1.3 – 3.18% positive return. These are the highest returns within the entire table. This 
suggests that Wells Fargo’s closest competitors were able to successfully profit off of Wells 
Fargo’s problem especially within the 30 days after the event occurred. The effect on middle-
sized and smallest deposit firms were fairly minor in comparison to the largest deposit firms. The 
range of returns for middle to smaller sized firms is -0.20 – 1.03%. This is smaller than the range 
for larger deposit firms showing the CARs for larger firms are more volatile. 
 Since univariate tests were done using the cumulative abnormal returns, multivariate tests 
will be completed to further analyze the effects of the lawsuit on firms in the industry. The 
analysis will be a regression with each CAR being the dependent variable. The independent 
variables of the first analysis will be deposit, Ln (size), Ln (Price), volatility, spread, and 
turnover. As mentioned in the data description section, the natural log of size and price was taken 
to normalize the distribution of each variable since they were heavily skewed. Table 7 displays 
the results of each regression, t-statistics of each variable, adjusted R², standard error, and 
number of observations. Volatility consistently has the greatest effect on the cumulative 
abnormal returns. The next strongest relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables is spread. This is reasonable since volatility and spread tend to be closely related which 
they did have the highest correlation in the data. So, it is not surprising they both have greater 
effects on the dependent variable. The control variable with the least effect on the cumulative 
abnormal returns is turnover. While the variable proves to be significant, the overall effect 
compared to the other variables is very miniscule. The deposit and size variables show high 
significance but lower effects on the dependent variable in comparison to the volatility variable. 
Of the six different regressions, CAR (0,1) is showing to be the best model based off the adjusted 
R² of .05188.  
 In order to further test the cumulative abnormal returns using a multivariate test, an 
interaction term will be added to the previous regression. The interaction term will between 
deposit and Ln(size). This will show if there is any significance in the size of the deposit firm. 
So, the new dependent variables are deposit, Ln(size), deposit*Ln(size), Ln(price), volatility, 
spread, and turnover. Table 8 displays the results of the new multivariate test using the 
interaction term. The interaction in columns [3], [4], and [6] are positive and significant 
suggesting that larger deposit institutions had the most positive CARs. The adjusted R² for each 
cumulative abnormal return increased from the previous model as well. CAR (0,1) is still the 
best model with an adjusted R² of .0717 which increased from .0519. Also, volatility and spread 
still have the greatest effect on the dependent variable. Turnover still shows high significance but 
low effect on the CARs. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Since markets provide a great deal of information on individual’s opinions of companies 
and information in the world, they can give us an idea on how people react and feel about corrupt 
behavior in the banking industry. It is important to understand the effects banking scandals have 
on the market because the world relies heavily on banks. Therefore, this paper analyzed the 
effects of the Wells Fargo banking scandal and its effects on the market in the financial industry. 
The data was found using Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) and The Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The stocks chosen had SIC codes 60 – 67 which is the 
finance, insurance, and real estate sector. Cumulative abnormal returns and various control 
factors were used to analyze the data. Then, various univariate and multivariate tests were 
completed.  
The univariate tests concluded that investors did not lose their confidence and trust in 
depository and non-depository institutions. This was determined by the positive abnormal returns 
for both of these institution types. The higher CARs were found within deposit firms which 
shows that Wells Fargo’s direct competitors profited the greatest. While these institution types 
reacted positively to the lawsuit, other types in the finance industry were negatively impacted. 
The negative effects on these firms was less than 1% which is fairly minimal in comparison to 
Wells Fargo’s returns. The size of the firm showed to have importance on the cumulative 
abnormal returns as well. The largest deposit firms experienced higher returns than middle to 
smaller sized firms. This suggests that the trust in middle to smaller sized firms stayed fairly 
consistent since they were not affected by the scandal as much.  
 For the multivariate tests, volatility was found to have the greatest effect on the 
cumulative abnormal returns of the stocks. Size of the firm and whether or not the firm was a 
deposit institution showed high significance but a lower effect on the CARs. This was in 
comparison to the effects the volatility variable. The interaction term of size and deposit showed 
some significance especially after the event occurred. Overall, for this banking scandal, 
volatility, deposit, and size were the most important factors that affected the CARs of the stocks. 
 While this analysis gives a small insight into the effects banking scandals have on the 
market, there is further examination that will need to be done. There are more univariate, 
multivariate tests as well as others that could be ran on this specific scandal. One idea for the 
multivariate tests would be to test other combinations of interaction terms. The volatility and 
deposit variable may be an interesting combination to analyze. It could test the significance and 
effect that deposit firms with an elevated volatility have on the CARs. Further analysis into the 
other firms that were negatively impacted would be interesting for further univariate testing. This 
analysis could break down the other firms’ section by each SIC code to figure out which ones 
were more affected and potentially figure out why. Now, in order to gain a better understanding 
of banking scandals effects on the market, it would be beneficial to further investigate other 
banking scandals as well. This one scandal is not sufficient enough for us to have full confidence 
in how a market reacts to banks committing illegal practices but it does provide a small glimpse.  
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Table 1 – Sample Firms 
 
SIC Code No. of Firms Description 
60 356 Depository Institutions 
61 44 Non-Depository Credit Institutions 
62 90 Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, and Services 
63 119 Insurance Carriers 
64 14 Insurance Agents, Brokers and Service 
65 46 Real Estate 




Table 2 – Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 25th Perc. Median 75th Perc. Maximum 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Size (in 
1000s) 
2,500,731 11,731,528 548 57,217 239,968 945,910 251,772,795 
Price 106.955 3,977.418 0.555 15.638 25.290 43.818 224,740.000 
Volatility 0.011 0.015 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.014 0.362 
Spread 0.004 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.205 
Turnover 13.028 69.650 0.000 1.320 3.194 6.849 2,752.836 
Deposit 0.112 0.315 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Non-
Deposit 
0.014 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
  
Table 3 – Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 Size Price Volatility Spread Turnover Deposit Non-Deposit 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
Size 1.0000       
Price 0.2662 1.0000      
Volatility -0.0151 -0.0089 1.0000     
Spread -0.0634 -0.0057 0.3075 1.0000    
Turnover -0.0047 -0.0030 0.2248 -0.0351 1.0000   
Deposit 0.0754 -0.0071 0.1022 0.1132 -0.0461 1.0000  




Table 4 – Wells Fargo – Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 CAR (-5,5) CAR (-3,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,5) CAR (0,30) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Wells Fargo -0.0709 -0.0432 0.0119 -0.0205 -0.0478 -0.0581 
 
  




Panel A. All Firms 
 CAR (-5,5) CAR (-3,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,5) CAR (0,30) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Mean -0.0023 -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0074 -0.0083 -0.0038 
Median -0.0034 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0060 -0.0070 -0.0034 
T-Statistics (-3.61) (-2.03) (-0.89) (-13.75) (-14.2601) (-2.7269) 
       
Panel B. Deposit Firms 
Mean 0.0038 0.0062 0.0103 0.0059 0.0015 0.0158 
Median 0.0007 0.0060 0.0092 0.0062 0.0012 0.0130 
T-Statistics (1.78) (3.82) (9.25) (5.12) (0.99) (4.98) 
       
Panel C. Non-Deposit Firms 
Mean 0.0184 0.0088 0.0083 0.0019 0.0119 0.0728 
Median 0.0039 -0.0012 0.0071 -0.0007 0.0015 0.0436 
T-Statistics (1.54) (0.88) (1.62) (0.24) (1.27) (2.01) 
       
Panel D. Other Firms 
Mean -0.0034 -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0093 -0.0099 -0.0075 
Median -0.0038 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0074 -0.0078 -0.0052 
T-Statistics (-5.25) (-3.84) (-3.99) (-16.02) (-16.07) (-5.30) 
 
  




Panel A. Largest Deposit Firms 
 CAR (-5,5) CAR (-3,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,5) CAR (0,30) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Mean -0.0025 0.0061 0.0218 0.0130 0.0027 0.0318 
Median -0.0010 0.0110 0.0230 0.0160 0.0053 0.0286 
T-Statistics (-0.96) (3.06) (13.28) (6.61) (1.14) (6.48) 
       
Panel B. Middle-Sized Deposit Firms 
Mean 0.0037 0.0046 0.0087 0.0022 -0.0020 0.0103 
Median 0.0027 0.0030 0.0083 0.0015 -0.0010 0.0065 
T-Statistics (1.32) (2.25) (6.08) (1.28) (-0.97) (2.12) 
       
Panel C. Smallest Deposit Firms 
Mean 0.0102 0.0078 0.0004 0.0025 0.0039 0.0050 
Median 0.0007 0.0033 0.0005 0.0020 0.0006 0.0082 
T-Statistics (2.02) (1.98) (0.17) (1.18) (1.17) (0.80) 
 
  




 CAR (-5,5) CAR (-3,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,5) CAR (0,30) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Deposit 0.0075 0.0084 0.0130 0.0166 0.0126 0.0236 
 (3.65) (4.74) (9.18) (9.65) (6.70) (5.26) 
Ln(Size) -0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0029 
 (-6.75) (-5.97) (-3.46) (-3.35) (-4.11) (-4.44) 
Ln(Price) 0.0040 0.0033 -0.0009 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0046 
 (4.83) (4.59) (-1.56) (0.73) (1.04) (-2.58) 
Volatility 0.3870 0.4497 0.0413 0.0160 0.0563 0.3247 
 (8.17) (10.99) (1.27) (0.40) (1.30) (3.14) 
Spread 0.0741 -0.0486 -0.0309 -0.0006 0.0688 -0.0273 
 (1.15) (-0.87) (-0.69) (-0.01) (1.17) (-0.19) 
Turnover -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (-2.26) (-2.50) (8.49) (8.74) (8.08) (6.38) 
Constant 0.0046 0.0018 0.0088 -0.0016 -0.0001 0.0393 
 (1.12) (0.52) (3.14) (-0.45) (-0.03) (4.41) 
Adjusted R² 0.0401 0.0509 0.0519 0.0511 0.0399 0.0383 
N 3192 3192 3192 3192 3192 3192 
 
  




 CAR (-5,5) CAR (-3,3) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,3) CAR (0,5) CAR (0,30) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Deposit 0.0190 -0.0041 -0.0674 -0.0267 -0.0010 -0.1345 
 (1.34) (-0.33) (-6.90) (-2.23) (-0.08) (-4.32) 
Ln(Size) -0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0036 
 (-6.46) (-6.06) (-5.03) (-3.99) (-4.23) (-5.35) 
Deposit*Ln(Size) -0.0009 0.0010 0.0061 0.0033 0.0010 0.0120 
 (-0.82) (1.02) (8.31) (3.65) (1.05) (5.13) 
Ln(Price) 0.0040 0.0032 -0.0013 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0053 
 (4.88) (4.49) (-2.23) (0.44) (0.96) (-2.99) 
Volatility 0.3876 0.4491 0.0374 0.0139 0.0556 0.3171 
 (8.18) (10.97) (1.16) (0.35) (1.29) (3.08) 
Spread 0.0656 -0.0394 0.0278 0.0311 0.0787 0.0881 
 (1.00) (-0.70) (0.62) (0.57) (1.32) (0.62) 
Turnover -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (-2.27) (-2.49) (8.67) (8.79) (8.09) (6.46) 
Constant 0.0039 0.0026 0.0140 0.0012 0.0007 0.0494 
 (0.92) (0.73) (4.89) (0.34) (0.19) (5.43) 
Adjusted R² 0.0400 0.0509 0.0717 0.0547 0.0399 0.0458 
N 3192 3192 3192 3192 3192 3192 
 
